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* Bank of Italy, Economics, Research and International Relations.    1 Introduction1
In recent years, many countries have reformed their public pension system, tightening the
eligibility rules and reducing the generosity of bene￿ts (Feldstein and Siebert, 2002). Partly
as a result, private pension plans have grown in terms both of assets under management
and number of participants (OECD, 2009), becoming increasingly important as a means to
provide adequate retirement income.
Contrary to social security schemes, private pension investment requires the worker to
make several choices. He or she has to decide whether and how much to contribute, select
the most appropriate portfolio and possibly decide when to withdraw. These choices are
even more di¢ cult in a time of ￿nancial turmoil, when both the probability and the cost of
errors are magni￿ed. There is evidence (e.g. Benartzi and Thaler, 2002) that investors do
not exploit the freedom of choice granted by their pension plans in the best possible way.
In order to design rules and policies which help workers to get the most out of their
pension investments, it is important to understand if and how investors￿behaviour is sys-
tematically a⁄ected by individual characteristics, such as age and/or time to retirement,
sex, ￿nancial education, income.
While there is an extensive body of research about pension plan participation decisions,
far less attention has been devoted to portfolio allocation of fund participants. We aim to
shed light on this issue looking at a new panel dataset collecting information on participants
to a de￿ned contribution (DC) pension fund for employees of an Italian middle-sized bank.
In particular, we are interested in assessing the e⁄ect of ageing on portfolio choices.
According to recent optimal portfolio theories (see, e.g., Campbell and Viceira, 2002), in-
vestors should reduce their exposure to stock market risk as they get near to retirement.
However, it is often found that in reality investors are quite inertial in their behavior.2
As far as we know, only two other papers have studied life cycle patterns in portfolio
choices using panel data, both of which consider a sample of US workers. Agnew et al.
(2003) use a four year panel of participants in a large 401(k) plan. They include age and
time e⁄ects in their regression speci￿cation together with demographic variables. They ￿nd
that "age has a negative e⁄ect on the share held in equities: each extra year translates
into lower allocation to stocks by 93 basis points". Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) use a panel
data set from TIAA-CREF (a large US pension fund, open to public sector teachers and
university professors) and ￿nd that a substantial number of households do not own equities
and that individuals seldom take direct action to change their portfolio allocation. Over a
1The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily re￿ ect the position of
the Bank of Italy. We thank Sandro Momigliano, Giorgio Gobbi, and seminar participants at the Bank of
Italy, the 10th Anniversary Conference of CERP (Turin, September 2009), the Netspar Pension Workshop
(Amsterdam, February 2010) and LUISS (Rome, April 2010) for useful comments.
2Madrian and Shea (2001), Papke (2004), Agnew et al. (2003), Americks and Zeldes (2004), Mitchell et
al. (2006), Bilias et al. (2009).
5ten-year period, 44 percent of the sample made no changes to their allocation.
We believe that looking at investors outside the US is interesting because elsewhere the
pension fund industry is relatively less developed, and the equity culture is less widespread
(Guiso et al., 2003). Our sample is made up of a relatively homogeneous group of agents,
characterized by a high degree of ￿nancial literacy, as they are mostly clerical and managerial
workers in the banking sector. This clearly makes our sample not representative of the whole
Italian population. However, it also implies that any deviation from optimizing/rational
behaviour observed in our sample should be even more pronounced at the population level.
We use amministrative data from an Italian DC pension plan. While administrative
records contain relatively few variables for each individual, data of this kind have the im-
portant advantage, with respect to survey-based data, of recording actual choices, thereby
also reducing the risk of measurement errors.
The observed period goes from 2002 to 2008. Each year fund participants choose to
allocate their accumulated wealth in one of ￿ve sub-funds, which are unambiguously ranked
in terms of their risk pro￿le.3 Contrary to other papers, the set of alternatives is basically
unchanged during the whole sample period.4
Our empirical analysis shows that on average age induces investors to reduce their
exposure to equities, as recent theories predict. However, we also document that many of
them are quite inertial in their asset allocation and that this can prove to be costly, as older
workers might ￿nd themselves over-exposed to stock market risk.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we describe the
structure of the pension fund under examination. In the third section we outline the charac-
teristics of our data set and present some summary statistics concerning investment choices
and fund performance. In Section 4, we study the portfolio choices of the workers and the
impact of age on the decision to switch from one sub-fund to another, controlling for several
other possible determinants. In the last section, we draw some tentative conclusions and
policy implications.
2 Fund structure
We draw our data from an Italian DC pension plan. Our dataset includes information on
yearly individual investment choices for all 3,820 retirement accounts - outstanding for at
3This set up, which is typical in Italian employer-sponsored pension plans, is also common in other
countries. For example, mandatory individual accounts systems in Chile and other Latin American countries
allow workers to choose among a limited number of "lifestyle" funds. The same is true for the mandatory
systems of Central and Eastern European countries. Other countries (for example Sweden and Australia)
allow a much wider variety of choices (Tapia and Yermo, 2007).
4This may be important because it has been shown that the behaviour of participants may be im-
paired/distorted by a high degree of complexity (Choi et al., 2006) or by changes in the menu of investment
options (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001, 2002).
6least 1 year - from December 2002 to December 2008, for a total of 18,629 year-investor
data points. The plan is sponsored by a medium sized Italian bank operating mainly in
northern Italy and it is open to all the bank￿ s employees. At the end of 2008, the plan
covered about 97% of the workforce. Upon enrolment, participants choose one of the ￿ve
sub-funds o⁄ered by the plan. Once a year, at the end of November, participants can
switch between sub-funds and change the level of their contributions. They receive a letter
reminding them of the deadline; an advisory service (Internet and telephone-based) is active
throughout the year, helping participants to self-assess their risk preferences and to choose
the appropriate sub-fund. If they choose to switch, the change is e⁄ective from 1 January
of the following year. Participants can choose only one sub-fund among those o⁄ered by the
plan; that is, they cannot divide their accumulated wealth among several sub-funds. When
a participant chooses to switch, her entire wealth is disinvested from the previous sub-fund
and moved into the new one. Our dataset includes information on yearly individual choices
and on demographic and employment characteristics, such as gender, age, marital status,
position and seniority of service. As is often the case with administrative data, it contains
no information on non-retirement wealth and on income.5 This limitation is shared with
the above-mentioned studies by Agnew et al. (2003) and Ameriks and Zeldes (2004).
The plan o⁄ers ￿ve sub-funds: guaranteed returns, money-market, bond, balanced bond
and balanced equity. Each sub-fund has a target asset allocation, which the portfolio man-
ager maintains during the year, rebalancing the portfolio when necessary. The money-
market sub-fund is invested in euro-denominated money-market instruments (at least 80%)
and other debt securities (up to 20%); the bond sub-fund is invested in euro-denominated
money-market instruments (up to 20%) and other debt securities (at least 80%); the bal-
anced sub-fund is invested in money-market instruments (up to 20%), other debt securities
(up to 80%), and equities (up to 40%); the equity sub-fund is invested in money-market
instruments (up to 20%), other debt securities (up to 50%), and equities (up to 60%).6
The precise asset allocation of each sub-fund in a given year is communicated to partici-
pants every year before they choose their sub-fund. Each sub-fund￿ s return and that of its
benchmark are published on a regular basis.
3 Summary statistics
3.1 Participants￿characteristics
In Table 1 we present some statistics on the demographic characteristics of plan participants
(information on salary, marital status and job position, as of December 2008) and compare
5Actually, income is available only for the last period in our sample, and it is collinear with job position.
6At the end of 2004, there was a change in the target asset allocation of the balanced bond and balanced
equity sub-funds, whose target equity shares was increased respectively from 20 to 30 and from 40 to 60.
7them with those of Italian private sector workers at large, taken from the latest wave (2006)
of the Bank of Italy survey on household income and wealth (SHIW).7 Our sample of di⁄ers
from the Italian population in several respects.
Workers in our sample have, on average, higher earnings than private sector workers
in general and a higher level of education (94% have completed high school or college,
compared with 44% of private sector employees). They are almost all clerical or managerial
workers (98% of the total); mostly male (68%); relatively young (24% are less than 30 years
old) and with relatively short job tenure (43% have less than ￿ve years of tenure).
About 40% of the participants has been in the sample for all the 7 years.
3.2 Investment choices
At the end of December 2008, 30% of fund participants had their wealth invested in the
riskiest portfolio; 36% in the balanced one, 34% in the three remaining portfolios (Table
2).8 Through time, there has been a shift in the relative importance of the two riskiest
portfolios, which are the only ones which invest in shares: in 2002 they were chosen by
75% of participants, in 2008 this proportion drops to 65%. This is probably related to the
disappointing stock market performance during the observed period.
Switches only account for about 9% of all the investor-year observations: most par-
ticipants con￿rm their previous portfolio choices most of the time (table 3).9 However,
during our 7-years period, 25% of the 3,820 individuals observed switched at least once.
The percentage rises to 48% among those that joined the plan from the start.
Male and female workers do not di⁄er much in their portfolio choices, even though
females switch slightly less than males (8,5% vs 9.9%).10 With respect to education, the
main di⁄erence is between the least educated group (people with only a primary school
certi￿cate) and the others. Indeed, less than 60% of the former invest in shares, compared
with more than 70% in the other groups. More educated switchers are more likely to switch
toward more risky lines than less educated ones. There are no clear patterns with regard
to job position.
Finally, sizable di⁄erences are apparent across age groups. In particular, while the share
of those who choose the two sub-funds exposed to stock market risk is above 75% for those
younger than 50, it drops to about 50% for those over 50. Moreover, the propensity to
switch is higher for older workers, and in particular the elderly are relatively much more
likely to switch toward less risky lines.
7The survey provides a representative sample of the Italian population. More information is available in
Bank of Italy (2008).
8At the end of 2008 the total wealth accumulated in the fund amounted to e108 million.
9This may be due, at least partly, to the fact that the intention to shift has to be noti￿ed to the fund
while the choice to remain in the same line is made tacitly.
10On gender di⁄erences in portfolio choices, see Barber and Odean (2001).
83.3 Performance
Looking at monthly annualized returns from 2002 to 2008, we can notice that our sample
is characterized by two periods of low returns and high volatility in stock markets. The
￿rst started at end-2001 and lasted until mid-2003 and the second started in the summer
of 2007, with the recent ￿nancial turmoil (Figures 1-3). In particular, in 2008 the annual
return of the balanced equity line was equal to -28% while that of the balanced bond
sub-fund was -7%. Investing in one of these portfolios would have implied a severe loss
in investors￿retirement wealth, especially harmful for older workers, given their shorter
investment horizon. In this section we try to evaluate the e⁄ects of the decision to change
sub-fund on realized returns.
First, we look at returns in the year following a switch. In the short term, changing
sub-fund has been pro￿table, allowing the investor to gain on average more than 1% with
respect to a passive conduct.
As one-period gains or losses are more important for workers approaching retirement,
which do not have the option to wait for market values to recover, we made separate
computations for older investors. Workers 50+ y.o. who switched sub-fund at least once
earned on average a return 2.9% higher than those who did not. Moreover, in 2008 older
workers who switched sub-fund avoided considerable losses which amounted on average to
25% of their retirement wealth, i.e. more than e22,000.11
While looking at one-period-ahead returns might be a sensible approximation for older
workers, this is of course not true for younger ones, who have a longer investment horizon. So
we also compute gains and losses for the whole sample period. We consider the individuals
that were present from the start to the end of the sample and decided to change only once,
then compare their 7-years returns at the end of 2008 to what they would have earned if
they had not switched. On average, the cumulative gains from switching amount to more
than 18%.
4 Multivariate analysis
4.1 A simple empirical framework
For illustrative purposes let us consider a very standard mean-variance investor with utility
function:
U(￿it;￿it) = ￿itErs + (1 ￿ ￿it)rb ￿
1
2￿it
V ar(￿itrs + (1 ￿ ￿it)rb),
11As we remarked above, if they switch, older participants tend to switch to safer investment lines.
9where we assume that there is a risky asset (with mean return Ers and variance of the
returns equal to ￿2) and a riskless asset (with returns equal to rb < Ers) and that the worker
can choose among 3 sub-funds (labeled 0,1 and 2), which di⁄er in the fraction ￿ of the risky
asset in their portfolios (without loss of generality, let ￿ be increasing: 0 = ￿0 < ￿1 < ￿2).
We assume ￿ to vary systematically according to a set of individual-speci￿c variables Xit
and an idiosyncratic preference shift "it :
￿it = ￿Xit + "it:
This parameter measures the propensity to invest in the risky asset and it is thus linked to
the degree of risk aversion: the higher ￿ the more the investor is willing to accept risk in
exchange for higher expected returns. In our simple set-up, it turns out that:
￿it = ￿0 if 2￿it <
￿2
E(rs) ￿ rb(￿0 + ￿1)
￿it = ￿1 if
￿2
E(rs) ￿ rb(￿0 + ￿1) < 2￿it <
￿2
E(rs) ￿ rb(￿1 + ￿2)
￿it = ￿2 if 2￿it >
￿2
E(rs) ￿ rb(￿1 + ￿2)
Under the standard normality assumption for "it it is straightforward to derive the condi-
tional distribution of ￿it given Xit:
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where ￿ is the cumulative density function of the normal distribution. Note that in this
simple speci￿cation the thresholds do not vary across individuals.
This is an ordered probit model, where ￿ plays the role of the latent variable and ￿it is
the observable choice variable, and it can be estimated using standard maximum likelihood
techniques.
104.2 Expected asset allocation
We estimate the model described in the previous section on the pooled set of workers￿choices
for the 2002-2008 period. Besides age (summarized by four age dummies), we consider as
possibile determinants of the risk propensity parameter gender, marital status, education
and job position. In all our regressions, we also include a full set of year dummies to
capture unobserved time-speci￿c e⁄ects, among which (perceived) changes in the process
driving share prices. These time dummies are also interacted with the four age dummies,
to check for possible changes over time of the age e⁄ect.
For the sake of clarity, we merge together the guaranteed return, the money-market and
the bond sub-funds (however, we checked that results do not vary if we consider each of the
￿ve lines separately).
Tables 4 and 5 give our baseline estimation results: in the former table we report the
estimated ￿ coe¢ cients, in the latter we report the average marginal e⁄ects of a change in
the independent variables on the probability to choose each sub-fund. Table 6 shows how
the probability of choosing each sub-fund changes through years and age classes.
Overall, the ￿ndings of the univariate analysis are con￿rmed. In particular, the reduction
in equity-holding due to ageing is statistically signi￿cant. On average, the probability of
being in a zero-share portfolio increases with age, while the reverse is true for the probability
to be in the riskiest sub-fund. The e⁄ect is particularly strong for the fourth age bracket
(50+ y.o.).
In order to better assess the economic signi￿cance of the e⁄ects (Wooldridge, 2002) we
compute the expected fraction of equities in the chosen portfolio, ￿it,:
E(￿itjXit) = ￿0P(￿it = a0jXit) + ￿1P(￿it = a1jXit) + ￿2P(￿it = a2jXit):
The relationship between age and the holding of stocks changes across time, becoming
stronger at the end of the sample; moreover, while in the ￿rst years of the sample the age-
stockholding pro￿le is hump-shaped, starting from 2006, it becomes monotonically negative
(Table 7 and Figure 4). This may be due to the fact that workers - observing the losses
su⁄ered by their colleagues who retired during periods of declining share prices - have learnt
that being exposed to stock market risk when they are near to retirement is very risky. In
2002 a married male with a white collar position and a high school degree can be expected
to hold in equities a fraction of his portfolio equal to 37% if he is younger than 30, which
drops to 25% if he is older than 50. In 2008, these two ￿gures are 38% and 18%, respectively.
Concerning controls, being male and/or having a better job position decreases the proba-
bility of choosing a zero-share portfolio and increases the probability of choosing the riskiest
portfolio in a statistically signi￿cant way (Table 5). No impact is instead attributable to
education (in particular, a high school or a university diploma do not change the probability
11of holding equities). This could be due to the easy set up provided by the fund, and/or to
strong social interaction e⁄ects, such that the ￿nancial skills of the more educated workers
bene￿t also the less educated participants. We also considered a less parsimonious speci￿ca-
tion in which age was interacted with all other controls. However, such interactions turned
out to be not statistically signi￿cant. We can conclude that the relationship between age
and portfolio does not di⁄er for workers which are more educated or with a better job posi-
tion. Finally, we also run a regression in which instead of the four age dummies we included
age in years and age squared, but the results did not qualitatively change.
4.3 Conditional switching probabilities
In this section, we focus speci￿cally on shifts from one sub-fund to another. As we saw above,
most workers usually stay with the fund they have chosen, however 25% of them switch
line at least once. Therefore it is worth examining the e⁄ect of ageing on the propensity to
switch.
To this aim, we exploit the panel dimension of our data set and run our baseline re-
gression conditional on the sub-fund choosen in the previous year. This also allows us to
control for unobservable time-invariant characteristics.
We proceed in two steps. First, we run our baseline regression on di⁄erent sub-samples,
grouping people according to the sub-fund that they chose in period t-1 (Table 8). As
before, dependent variables include dummies for gender, education, job position, marital
status, years, and age.
Second, we use the estimated parameters to compute the conditional probability of
switching from one sub-fund to another. The probabilities are summarized in conditional
transition matrices (Tables 9, 10, 11 and 12).12 The elements on the main diagonal of each
matrix give, for a particular participant (e.g., a male, middle manager, higher educated,
unmarried participant choosing his retirement account asset allocation in 2008), the proba-
bility of remaining in the old sub-fund; on the contrary, the elements o⁄ the main diagonal
give the probability of switching from the sub-fund on the row to the one on the column.
We compute di⁄erent matrices for alternative settings of the X variables in order to assess
the impact of each co-variate.
The age e⁄ect highlighed in the previous sections is again quite strong (Table 9). The
probability of remaining in the riskiest sub-fund is 96% for a less-than-30 y.o. worker, falling
to 85% for a 50+ y.o. worker. Moreover, the probability of switching towards less risky
lines starting from the balanced one is much lower for the young than for the old participant
(6% versus 18%).
The likelihood of switching towards less risky portfolios is higher at the beginning and
12A similar approach, applied to a di⁄erent issue, is adopted by Nickell et al (2000).
12at the end of the sample, when the returns from the stock market were particularly dis-
appointing. In 2005 (a year of relatively bullish markets), the probability of not changing
fund was 95% for those starting in the riskiest fund and 93% for those starting in the bal-
anced fund. These probabilities were, respectively, 93% and 90% in 2008, and 87% and
86% in 2002 (Table 10). Most importantly, the probability of switching towards riskier
lines for those in the zero-equities portfolios was much lower during the end-of-period and
the beginning-of-period stock market crashes: indeed, for those starting from the no-shares
lines, the probability was 18% in 2005, compared with 4% and 2% respectively in 2002 and
2008. The e⁄ect of job position on the probability of switching is not statistically signi￿cant
(Table 11).This is di⁄erent from what we found in the previous section, in which we studied
the probability of being in a particular sub-fund. Finally, education has a positive but small
impact on the probability of switching from the zero-equities fund towards the riskier ones.
(Table 12).
5 Conclusions
We studied investors￿portfolio choices in a very simple real-world setup. Some results
prove quite robust across all the empirical exercises we performed. In particular, we found
a pronounced tendency to choose safer portfolios as people age. This e⁄ect is still there after
controlling for several demographic factors, for time e⁄ects, and for the sub-fund chosen in
the previous period. This result is broadly in line with other micro-evidence from the US
market, and is consistent with models of life-cycle rational portfolio allocation.
Still, not all elderly people in our sample reduced their exposure to risk. Looking at the
ones present in the sample from the start, it turns out that more than 30% of the elderly
workers who were exposed to stock market risk in 2002 were still exposed to it in 2008. As
the stock marlet events of the last decade show, an elderly worker taking risk on the stock
market could pay a high price if stocks fall. This evidence suggests that life cycle funds
could be a valuable instrument, given that they automatically bring all the participants
toward less risky allocations as they get near to retirement (Viceira, 2007). In the Chilean
system, for example, a lifecycle fund is the default option for all the workers. Moreover, the
riskiest sub-funds are closed to individuals older than a certain age.
The e⁄ect of age is more pronounced in the last years of the sample. This might be
due to the fact that investors learn form the experience of their colleagues. Indeed, in our
sample there have been periods of disappointing stock market performance. Having seen
that people who retired during these bear market periods have been severely hit might have
pushed investors toward a more active behaviour. A better understanding of this form of
learning appears to be an interesting issue for further research.
We also ￿nd that job position has an impact on portfolio choice (but not on the prob-
13ability of switching): people with a higher position tend to take more risks. This tallies
with previous empirical analyses and can be consistent with optimal portfolio allocation
(Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2008, Chiappori and Paiella, 2008 and Cappelletti, 2009). We
also ￿nd that education has no clear impact on portfolio choices, even if it slightly increases
the likelihood of switching for those in the zero-shares sub-funds. The weakness of this e⁄ect
could be due to the easy set up provided by the fund, and/or to strong social interaction
e⁄ects, in which the ￿nancial skills of the educated employees who make up most of our
sample also bene￿t the few uneducated participants. As an issue for further research, one
could investigate whether this is due to social interactions taking place among colleagues in
the same bank￿ s subsidiary (Du￿ o and Saez, 2003).
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18Table 1: Statistics on plan participants
(number of workers and percentages)






Female 1,216 31.8 496 30.5 38.7 49.4
Male 2,604 68.2 1130 69.5 61.3 50.6
Age
Under 30 920 24.1 55 3.4 22.1 14.4
30-39 1,232 32.3 563 34.6 32.4 28.3
40-49 956 25.0 592 36.4 30.5 34.5
Over 50 712 18.6 416 25.6 15.0 22.7
Marital status
Unmarried 1,517 39.7 405 24.9 59.6 61.8
Married 1,881 49.2 1100 67.7 32.6 26.4
No longer married 148 3.9 100 6.2 7.9 11.8
Unknown 274 7.2 21 1.3
Education
Elementary and middle school 188 4.9 117 7.2 56.3 12.5
High school 2,008 52.6 977 60.1 35.3 60.6
University 1,572 41.2 530 32.6 8.4 26.9
Unknown 52 1.4 119 7.3
Job position
Blue collar 76 2.0 18 1.1 63.6 0.3
White collar 2,450 64.1 906 55.7 30.6 76.5
Middle management 1,221 32.0 651 40.0 4.0 18.1
Senior management 73 1.9 51 3.1 1.6 5.1
Salary (thousands of euros)
Up to 25 188 4.9 83 5.1 92.3 55.6
25-35 1,793 46.9 505 31.1 5.2 24.7
35-45 774 20.3 500 30.8 1.7 14.1
45-55 434 11.4 257 15.8 0.3 2.6
55 + 631 16.5 281 17.3 0.6 3.1
Tenure (years)
Less than 5 1,635 42.8 1 0.1 - -
5-14 1047 27.4 723 44.5 - -
15-24 449 11.8 369 22.7 - -
25-34 562 14.7 479 29.5 - -
35 + 127 3.3 54 3.3 - -
Entry-exit
Enrolled for 8 years (panel) 1,626 42.6 - - - -
Enter late 1,922 50.3 - - - -
Exit before December 2008 476 12.5 - - - -
Enter late and exit early 130 3.4 - - - -
Unknown 18 0.5 - - - -
Total 3,820 100.0 1626 100.0 - -
Note: Statistics for private sector employees are taken from the 2006 wave of the Bank of Italy survey on hiusehold income and
wealth (SHIW).
All plan participants Private sector employees Participants in the panel
19Table 2: Statistics on choices among sub-funds
(number of observations and percentages)
Guaranteed
return
Monetary Bond Balanced bond Balanced equity
Total 1,372 1,723 2,097 7,301 6,136 18,629
Year
2002 2.0 7.8 14.9 39.9 35.3 1,980
2003 3.6 8.9 16.0 37.8 33.7 2,119
2004 6.5 7.9 12.5 40.2 32.9 2,228
2005 7.8 6.3 9.7 40.5 35.8 2,390
2006 9.3 6.1 8.0 41.6 35.0 2,907
2007 9.1 10.6 10.0 39.5 30.8 3,490
2008 9.6 14.4 10.6 35.7 29.7 3,515
Gender
Female 4.7 8.1 13.0 43.9 30.3 5,782
Male 8.6 9.7 10.5 37.1 34.1 12,847
Age
Under 30 4.4 7.1 11.3 37.1 40.1 4,256
30-39 6.1 7.4 10.2 39.8 36.5 6,229
40-49 7.6 7.4 9.6 41.5 33.9 5,006
Over 50 13.4 18.9 15.9 37.0 14.8 3,138
Marital status
Unmarried 5.2 7.0 11.4 38.8 37.6 6,635
Married 8.9 9.9 10.4 39.8 30.9 10,492
No longer married 6.3 4.6 12.2 42.4 34.5 870
Education
Less than high school 6.8 17.0 17.9 38.1 20.1 1,010
High school 7.6 8.8 12.0 39.8 31.8 10,251
University 7.1 8.8 9.3 38.5 36.2 7,292
Job position
Blue collar 1.6 14.2 16.2 51.8 16.2 247
White collar 6.1 8.1 11.5 40.2 34.2 11,622
Middle management 9.5 11.1 10.7 37.2 31.5 6,331
Senior management 14.5 11.0 9.3 34.3 31.0 429
Salary (thousands of euros)
Up to 25 6.5 9.2 14.2 38.0 32.2 911
25-35 5.3 7.4 10.4 40.7 36.2 8,095
35-45 8.1 9.3 13.8 38.2 30.7 4,328
45-55 8.2 12.1 11.3 37.7 30.6 2,346
55 + 11.7 11.9 9.0 38.1 29.3 2,949
Tenure (years)
Less than 5 6.0 9.7 11.5 35.8 36.9 6,899
5-14 7.4 7.3 9.6 40.3 35.6 5,346
15-24 5.6 6.9 11.7 42.5 33.2 3,271
25-34 11.2 12.7 12.9 42.6 20.6 2,763
35 + 19.7 25.1 14.9 31.1 9.1 350
Composition of observations by fund (per cent)
Observations
20Table 3: Statistics on switches between sub-funds


















2002 1,861 1,521 340 18.3 86.5 13.5
2003 1,966 1,864 102 5.2 84.3 15.7
2004 1,984 1,704 280 14.1 64.3 35.7
2005 2,156 1,965 191 8.9 44.0 56.0
2006 2,341 2,094 247 10.6 64.4 35.6
2007 2,887 2,712 175 6.1 72.0 28.0
2008 3,490 3,250 240 6.9 87.1 12.9
Gender
Female 5,095 4,664 431 8.5 67.1 32.9
Male 11,590 10,446 1,144 9.9 74.2 25.8
Age
Under 30 5,857 5,373 484 8.3 57.0 43.0
30-39 5,125 4,624 501 9.8 71.9 28.1
40-49 4,094 3,700 394 9.6 81.5 18.5
Over 50 1,609 1,413 196 12.2 92.3 7.7
Marital status
Unmarried 5,575 5,100 475 8.5 61.3 38.7
Married 9,859 8,868 991 10.1 77.1 22.9
No longer married 829 764 65 7.8 80.0 20.0
Education
Elementary/middle school 978 883 95 9.7 87.4 12.6
High school 9,318 8,446 872 9.4 77.2 22.8
University 6,322 5,727 595 9.4 62.5 37.5
Job position
Blue collar 223 205 18 8.1 83.3 16.7
White collar 10,190 9,267 923 9.1 65.9 34.1
Middle management 5,854 5,267 587 10.0 81.6 18.4
Senior management 418 371 47 11.2 76.6 23.4
Salary (thousands of euros)
Up to 25 830 761 69 8.3 60.9 39.1
25-35 6,850 6,275 575 8.4 59.8 40.2
35-45 4,102 3,667 435 10.6 77.5 22.5
45-55 2,187 1,969 218 10.0 84.9 15.1
55 + 2,716 2,438 278 10.2 82.7 17.3
Tenure (years)
Less than 5 5,081 4,703 378 7.4 57.1 42.9
5-14 5,293 4,778 515 9.7 68.0 32.0
15-24 3,230 2,896 334 10.3 76.9 23.1
25-34 2,745 2,429 316 11.5 90.5 9.5
35 + 336 304 32 9.5 90.6 9.4
Total 16,685 15,110 1,575 9.4 72.3 27.7
21Table 4: Ordered probit model: pooled regression
(parameter estimates)
variable coef. variable coef.
Gender Age
           Female - Under 30 -
           Male 0.1094*** from 30 to 40 0.2276***
(0.0189) (0.0704)
from 40 to 50 0.3557***
Education (0.0714)
Over 50 -0.3435***
          Primary/middle school - (0.0824)
          High school 0.1781*** Time of the choice
(0.0418)
          University 0.1851***          2002 -
(0.0438)
         2003 -0.1111
(0.0737)
Job position          2004 0.0961
(0.0746)
          Blue collar workers -          2005 0.3123***
(0.0732)
          White collar workers 0.1462**          2006 0.4789***
(0.0688) (0.0673)
          Middle management 0.1636**          2007 0.2863***
(0.0707) (0.0649)




          Unmarried - (0.0875)
cut 2 0.8812
          Married -0.0165 (0.0876)
(0.0209)
          No longer married 0.111*** Observations 14665
(0.0422) pseudo R-squared 0.0352
Note: Ordered probit model estimated on the whole pooled sample. The dependent variable takes values 0,
40, and 60, conditional on the participant investing in a zero-shares fund, balanced bond fund or balanced
equity fund.
All explanatory variables are dummies. Results for the interaction terms between age and year dummies are
omitted. The reference dummies are: female, primary and middle school, blue collar workers, unmarried,
2002. Significance levels: 1% (***); 5% (**), 10% (*).
22Table 5: Ordered probit model: pooled regression
(average marginal e⁄ects)
coeff. std. coeff. std. coeff. std.
Gender
   Female - - - - - -
   Male -0.0368 *** 0.006 -0.0032 *** 0.001 0.04 *** 0.007
Education
   Less than high school - - - - - -
   High school -0.043 0.032 -0.0078 0.009 0.0508 0.040
   University -0.0061 0.006 -0.0007 0.001 0.0068 0.007
Job position
   Blue collar - - - - - -
   White collar -0.0866 *** 0.023 0.0033 0.004 0.0833 *** 0.020
   Middle management -0.0996 *** 0.024 0.0018 0.004 0.0978 *** 0.020
   Senior management -0.1304 *** 0.028 -0.0045 0.006 0.1348 *** 0.029
Marital status
   Unmarried - - - - - -
   Married 0.0077 0.007 0.0008 0.001 -0.0085 0.008
   No longer married -0.0323  ** 0.013 -0.0059  ** 0.003 0.0382  ** 0.016
Age
   Under 30 - - - - - -
   From 30 to 40 0.0199 *** 55.000 0.0115 *** 0.003 -0.0315 *** 0.010
   From 40 to 50 0.0354 *** 0.009 0.0104 *** 0.003 -0.0458 *** 0.011
   Over 50 0.2993 *** 0.012 -0.0386 *** 0.005 -0.2608 *** 0.010
Time of the choice
   2002 - - - - - -
   2003 0.0252   ** 0.011 0.002 0.004 -0.0273  ** 0.013
   2004 0.0443 *** 0.011 0.0042 0.004 -0.0485 *** 0.013
   2005 0.022    ** 0.011 0.0031 0.004 -0.025     * 0.013
   2006 0.02        * 0.011 -0.0027 0.004 -0.0174 0.013
   2007 0.0356 *** 0.010 -0.009      ** 0.004 -0.0266  ** 0.012
   2008 0.075   *** 0.011 -0.0001 0.004 -0.0749 *** 0.012
Significance levels: 1% (***); 5% (**), 10% (*).
Changes in the population average probability of choosing a sub-fund when the value of a dummy variable changes from zero to one.
The reference dummies are: female, less than high school, blue collar, unmarried, 2002. Results on the interaction terms between age
and year dummies are omitted.
variable
Zero-share fund Balanced bond fund Balanced equity fund
23Table 6: Model-based probabilities of choosing a certain sub-fund
(percentage points)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
under 30 18.4 23.2 23.7 16.7 12.8 10.9 16.5
from 30 to 40 15.9 17.8 19.3 18.8 17.6 18.3 21.3
from 40 to 50 14.7 14.6 16.8 17.5 20.3 23.5 27.0
over 50 37.1 40.5 43.8 41.5 44.4 50.1 51.7
under 30 39.7 41.3 41.4 38.8 36.0 34.0 38.7
from 30 to 40 38.3 39.4 40.1 39.9 39.3 39.7 40.8
from 40 to 50 37.5 37.5 38.9 39.3 40.5 41.4 41.9
over 50 41.0 40.1 39.1 39.8 38.9 36.5 35.7
under 30 41.8 35.5 34.8 44.5 51.1 55.1 44.7
from 30 to 40 45.8 42.8 40.6 41.3 43.0 42.0 37.9
from 40 to 50 47.8 47.9 44.2 43.2 39.2 35.1 31.2
over 50 21.9 19.3 17.1 18.7 16.7 13.4 12.5
Balanced bond fund
 Note: Estimated probabililities implied by the ordered probit model. The reference is a male, white
collar, high school and married worker.
Zero-share fund
Balanced equity fund
Table 7: Expected asset allocation
(percentage points)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
under 30 37.0 33.7 33.3 38.4 41.5 43.3 38.4
from 30 to 40 39.0 37.5 36.4 36.7 37.6 37.1 35.0
from 40 to 50 39.9 40.0 38.2 37.7 35.7 33.5 31.3
over 50 25.4 23.6 22.0 23.2 21.7 19.0 18.2
Note: Model implied expected shares of stocks assuming that the zero-share, balanced bond and
balanced equity funds have values equal to 0%, 30% and 60% respectively. The reference is a male,
white collar, high school, married worker.
24Table 8: Ordered probit model: separate regressions
(parameters estimates)
Zero-shares fund Balanced bond fund Balanced equity fund
Male 0.0910 0.108** -0.0614
(0.0760) (0.0449) (0.0587)
Primary and middle school - - -
- - -
High school 0.534*** 0.0482 -0.0198
(0.206) (0.0889) (0.125)
University degree 0.660*** 0.132 -0.0261
(0.211) (0.0956) (0.132)
Blue collar workers - - -
- - -
White collar workers 0.433 -0.111 0.376
(0.411) (0.143) (0.256)
Middle management 0.230 -0.143 0.304
(0.418) (0.148) (0.257)
Senior management 0.476 -0.0696 0.535*
(0.462) (0.205) (0.290)
Married -0.101 0.0124 -0.138**
(0.0776) (0.0464) (0.0559)
Under 30 y.o. - - -
- - -
From 30 to 40 y.o. 0.212** -0.192*** -0.225***
(0.0972) (0.0637) (0.0787)
From 40 to 50 y.o. 0.148 -0.204*** -0.317***
(0.121) (0.0703) (0.0875)
over 50 y.o. -0.378*** -0.618*** -0.706***
(0.142) (0.0775) (0.105)
2002 - - -
- - -
2003 -0.0964 0.504*** 0.590***
(0.253) (0.0815) (0.106)
2004 0.847*** 0.531*** 0.0902
(0.225) (0.0883) (0.0806)
2005 0.855*** 0.827*** 0.499***
(0.226) (0.0845) (0.0957)
2006 0.686*** 0.806*** 0.0203
(0.229) (0.0826) (0.0792)
2007 0.124 0.674*** 0.229***
(0.238) (0.0772) (0.0865)
2008 -0.239 0.266*** 0.361***
(0.249) (0.0746) (0.0919)
cut 1 2.942*** -1.215*** -1.616***
(0.474) (0.165) (0.288)
cut 2 3.612*** 2.439*** -1.206***
(0.476) (0.170) (0.286)
Observations 3761 6565 5592
pseudo R-squared 0.1183 0.0605 0.0454
Note: The table shows parameter estimates of ordered probit models run separately for participants starting from a
zero-share, balanced bond and balanced equity funds.
The reference is a female, primary and middle school, blue collar, unmarried, under 30 y.o., 2002. Significance
levels: 1% (***); 5% (**), 10% (*).
25Table 9: Model-based conditional transition matrix by age
(percentages)
Zero-shares Balanced bond Balanced equity
Zero-shares 98.7% 1.1% 0.2%
- - -
Balanced bond 6.2% 92.1% 1.7%
- - -
Balanced equity 1.6% 2.6% 95.8%
- - -
Zero-shares 97.8% 1.8% 0.4%
(-1.93) (1.98) (1.66)
Balanced bond 8.9% 90.0% 1.1%
(3.02) (-2.85) (-2.57)
Balanced equity 2.8% 3.9% 93.3%
(2.76) (2.93) (-2.89)
Zero-shares 98.1% 1.6% 0.3%
(-1.19) (1.2) (1.13)
Balanced bond 9.1% 89.9% 1.0%
(2.9) (-2.76) (-2.5)
Balanced equity 3.5% 4.5% 92.0%
(3.35) (3.63) (-3.56)
Zero-shares 99.5% 0.4% 0.1%
(1.84) (-1.92) (-1.49)
Balanced bond 17.9% 81.8% 0.3%
(7.14) (-6.43) (-4.34)
Balanced equity 7.7% 7.8% 84.6%
(4.54) (6.02) (-5.34)
under 30 years old
from 30 to 40 years old
from 40 to 50 years old
Note: The reference individual is a male worker, white collar, with a high school degree, married,
choosing the investment fund at the end of 2008. The percentages show model-based probabilities to
switch form the initial fund (rows) to the chosen fund (columns); the values within parentheses show
the t-statistics of the difference between the probability in the same cell and the corresponding
probability in the reference matrix (the top matrix). Probabilities in bold are statistically different
from those of the reference matrix at the 5% significance level.
Initial fund
Chosen fund
over 50 years old
26Table 10: Model based conditional transition matrix by year
(percentages)
Zero-shares Balanced bond Balanced equity
Zero-shares 96.2% 3.1% 0.7%
- - -
Balanced bond 14.0% 85.5% 0.5%
- - -
Balanced equity 6.1% 6.7% 87.2%
- - -
Zero-shares 82.1% 12.3% 5.6%
(-4.73) (4.73) (3.95)
Balanced bond 2.8% 93.1% 4.0%
(-7.19) (4.51) (5.8)
Balanced equity 2.0% 3.1% 94.9%
(-4.48) (-5.14) (4.92)
Zero-shares 97.8% 1.8% 0.4%
(0.85) (-0.86) (-0.8)
Balanced bond 8.9% 90.0% 1.1%
(-3.35) (3.23) (3.17)
Balanced equity 2.8% 3.9% 93.3%
(-3.64) (-3.79) (3.79)
year 2008
Note: The reference individual is a 30-to-40 years old male worker, white collar, with a high school
degree and married. The percentages show model-based probabilities to switch form the initial fund
(rows) to the chosen fund (columns); the values within parentheses show the t-statistics of the
difference between the probability in the same cell and the corresponding probability in the reference
matrix (the top matrix). Probabilities in bold are statistically different from those of the reference





27Table 11: Model-based conditional transition matrix by job position
(percentages)
Zero-shares Balanced bond Balanced equity
Zero-shares 99.3% 0.6% 0.1%
- - -
Balanced bond 7.3% 91.3% 1.4%
- - -
Balanced equity 6.3% 6.8% 86.9%
- - -
Zero-shares 97.8% 1.8% 0.4%
(-1.55) (1.55) (1.49)
Balanced bond 8.9% 90.0% 1.1%
(0.84) (-0.88) (-0.69)
Balanced equity 2.8% 3.9% 93.3%
(-1.09) (-1.28) (1.17)
Zero-shares 98.7% 1.1% 0.2%
(-0.7) (0.69) (0.72)
Balanced bond 9.4% 89.6% 1.0%
(1.05) (-1.11) (-0.84)
Balanced equity 3.3% 4.4% 92.3%
(-0.93) (-1.07) (0.99)
Zero-shares 97.5% 2.0% 0.4%
(-1.1) (1.12) (1)
Balanced bond 8.3% 90.6% 1.2%
(0.34) (-0.34) (-0.34)





Note: The reference individual is a 30-to-40 years old male worker with a high school degree,
married, choosing the fund at the end of 2008. The percentages show model-based probabilities to
switch form the initial fund (rows) to the chosen fund (columns); the values within parentheses show
the t-statistics of the difference between the probability in the same cell and the corresponding
probability in the reference matrix (the top matrix). Probabilities in bold are statistically different




28Table 12: Model-based conditional transition matrix by education
(percentages)
Zero-shares Balanced bond Balanced equity
Zero-shares 99.5% 0.5% 0.1%
- - -
Balanced bond 9.7% 89.4% 0.9%
- - -
Balanced equity 2.7% 3.8% 93.5%
- - -
Zero-shares 97.8% 1.8% 0.4%
(-2.43) (2.53) (1.91)
Balanced bond 8.9% 90.0% 1.1%
(-0.53) (0.52) (0.56)
Balanced equity 2.8% 3.9% 93.3%
(0.16) (0.16) (-0.16)
Zero-shares 97.0% 2.4% 0.5%
(-2.86) (3.02) (2.16)
Balanced bond 7.6% 91.1% 1.3%
(-1.29) (1.23) (1.48)
Balanced equity 2.9% 3.9% 93.2%
(0.2) (0.2) (-0.2)
university
Note: The reference individual is a 30-to-40 years old male worker, white collar, married, choosing
the investment fund at the end of 2008. The percentages show model-based probabilities to switch
form the initial fund (rows) to the chosen fund (columns); the values within parentheses show the t-
statistics of the difference between the probability in the same cell and the corresponding probability
in the reference matrix (the top matrix). Probabilities in bold are statistically different from those of
the reference matrix at the 5% significance level.
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